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The end of the first decade of the new millennium was marred by a sudden and 
precipitous economic collapse, the likes of which had not been seen in nearly a century. 
This was not a localized affair but a globally-linked recession that touched nearly every 
nation in the developed world. The Eurozone, which had only just made its first tenuous 
steps towards monetary union, was among the hardest hit by the disaster. The focus of 
the Eurozone’s distress were the “PIIGS” states—Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and 
Spain. In response to a combination of poor capital controls and irresponsible investing, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were 
forced to hand down billions of euros in the form of numerous bailouts to help stabilize 
these states’ financial institutions. The PIIGS states, however, were not the only 
Eurozone members to suffer from the financial collapse: Cyprus, who joined the 
European Union in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2008, experienced similar fiscal turmoil. 
The ECB, however, did not respond to Cyprus with the same set of financial and 
monetary restructural requirements it did in response to the rest of its irresponsible 
children. It punished the island nation for its close ties with Russia by instituting an 
unprecedented bail-in policy that to this day risks the economic stability of Europe. 
While this study gives a brief analysis of the factors that led to the financial collapse 
within several of the PIIGS states1 and the ECB’s response to each case, my main 
purpose is to demonstrate how the ECB’s disproportionate punishment of Cyprus has 
                                               
1 Since Italy has yet to receive a bailout from the ECB, it will not be examined in this paper. 
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risked leading the Eurozone down a dangerous financial path from which it may not be 
able to recover. 
 
Background 
Although the global housing bubble had already peaked by 2006, the current 
global financial crisis began in earnest in early fall 2008 with the collapse of key financial 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, due to the effects of drastic 
overleveraging of capital in risky subprime mortgage loans. These rapid failures spread 
like a contagion throughout international financial markets. Although far from being the 
first financial crisis of its kind in recent memory—Reinhart and Rogoff identify 18 
separate financial crises since the Second World War with similar financial 
circumstances2—it has resulted in the deepest global recession since the Great 
Depression.3 
The PIIGS states faced a problem heretofore unseen in modern finance: since 
they had all become members of Eurozone, they had ceded sovereign control of their 
own fiscal policies to the European Union, making them less able to respond to shifts 
within their respective economies. Notably, they lack the ability to devalue their own 
currency, thus losing one of the most potent tools of a state to directly affect interest, 
                                               
2 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008) 
3 (Davis 2008) 
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and by extension investment, rates.4 This lack of fiscal self-determination makes them 
an interesting area of study, particularly in light of the changes brought to the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) caused by “the Cypriot problem”. Because of Cyprus’s 
failures and fiscal mismanagements, and perhaps due to its close relationship with 
Russia, the depositors of Cyprus’s primary banks were forced by the ECB to take 
significant “haircuts,” that is, losing nearly 10% of their deposited Euros. This was the 
price Cyprus paid in order to receive a loan to recapitalize their financial institutions—in 
stark contrast to the taxpayer-funded bailouts received by the rest of the PIIGS states. 
This change in fiscal response mechanism is one that risks the very foundation of the 
Eurozone by further reducing faith of potential investors in Eurozone markets. 
 
Spain 
In order to understand the raw deal given to Cyprus, we must first look to the 
other primary recipients of aid from the ECB.  Upon reflection, the difficult measures 
enforced in these countries will seem even-handed when compared to the treatment 
that Cyprus received. As Spain is the fourth largest economy in the Eurozone, the 
prospect of a Spanish economic failure would pose catastrophic consequences to not 
only the Euro, but to the survival of the European Union itself.5  Spain’s sudden state of 
affairs came as something of a shock in the grand scheme of the Eurozone crisis. For the 
                                               
4 (The PIIGS that won't fly 2010) 
5 (The Euro Crisis: How to save Spain 2012) 
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better part of the first decade of the 21st century, the country seemed to be handling its 
finances responsibly, ensuring that its debt to GDP ratio remained at acceptable levels. 
Between 2007 and 2009 however, the Spanish deficit rose to over 11% its GDP while its 
total national debt was resting at 70% of GDP.6 According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Spain’s woes were caused at least in part by a permanent loss of revenue 
due to the international financial crisis: “The persistence of deficits reflects permanent 
revenue losses, primarily from a steep decline in potential GDP during the crisis, but also 
due to the impact of lower asset prices and financial sector profits”.7 The problems did 
not start with just these economic indicators, however. Like the other states most 
affected by the financial crisis, excessive optimism in the housing market, combined 
with subprime mortgage lending, caused strain on Spain’s financial institutions.8  
In June of 2012, Spain formally requested the aid from the European Union to 
recapitalize its ailing financial sector, receiving over €100 billion from the ECB.9 In 
exchange, Spain was required to undergo austerity measures including cutting the 
deficit by €65 billion over three years10 in order to bring its financial sector back under 
control.11 In January of 2014, Spain successfully completed the structural readjustment 
                                               
6 (Debt Crisis: The Spanish Problem 2010) 
7 (FIscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund 2010) 
8 (Frayer 2014) 
9 (On being propped up 2013) 
10 (Roman and Winning 2012) 
11 (Geitner, Kulish and Minder 2012) 
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requirements imposed by the ECB, including the merger of 38 financial institutions and 
major reforms to the house lending market12—although unemployment rates remain at 
nearly one quarter of the labor force.13 While still not back to pre-crash levels, Spain is 
well on its way to recovery through the program set out by the ECB. 
Ireland 
Prior to 2002, Ireland had what seemed to be one of the relatively healthiest 
economies within the Eurozone, with nearly full employment levels at a 4% nominal 
unemployment rate.14 Like the United States, however, it focused entirely too much on 
the housing sector and its related industries. While the Irish financial sector appeared as 
profitable as ever, its true status was masked by an over-reliance on speculative 
investments and aggressive construction. The government was likewise overly trusting 
of what we now know to be a bubble in housing prices, with more than 16% of the tax 
base of the country stemming directly from stamp duties, Value-Added Taxes (VAT), and 
capital gains taxes based on land.15 When the bubble burst, not only were the banks 
hamstrung, but the government found itself bereft of a great percentage of expected 
revenues deriving from the aforementioned taxes. 
                                               
12 (On being propped up 2013) 
13 (Román 2015) 
14 (The European Commission 2012) 
15 Ibid. 
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When the housing market crashed in 2008, the Irish government decided to 
cover the full cost of the debts of the affected banks as well as that of recapitalizing 
them; along with the tax shortfall experienced as a result of the same crash, these 
measures caused the government to be unable to effectively service their foreign debt 
stocks, shutting them out of the international debt market. In November of 2010, 
Ireland was forced to receive an €85 billion bailout and imposed structural readjustment 
or risk intentional neglect from the ECB. The specifics of these reforms are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but include elements such as mergers of financial institutions, 
lowering of the minimum wage, steep cut backs to government programs, and harsh 
restrictions on how and to whom banks can lend money.1617  
Although one of the countries hardest hit by the recession, Ireland is now on the 
path to recovery since its exit from its bailout program in late 2013.18 Recapitalization of 
the banks has been successfully concluded, the nation has been meeting every 
benchmark for reducing the budget deficit to acceptable levels, and efforts are 
underway to reform the labor market across the board after the collapse of the 
regulatory, financial, and housing markets.19 
 
                                               
16 (German Federal Ministry of Finance 2013) 
17 (Castle 2015) 
18 (Ireland's bail-out exit 2013)  
19 Ibid. 
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Portugal 
Unlike Ireland, at the onset of the economic crisis Portugal was in the midst of 
political as well as economic turmoil.20 In 2009, Prime Minister José Sócrates's 
controlling grasp of the Assembly of the Republic was loosened when his socialist party 
lost ground to smaller fringe parties on both the left and the right. Although still 
maintaining a plurality of the assembly, the socialists seemed to be headed into a forced 
coalition with radical fringe parties. This outcome would have threatened their political 
existence from the ensuing backlash:  allying with left-fringe parties like the Left Block 
could have induced far more radical reforms than Sócrates's socialist party would 
allow—including sweeping rounds of nationalization and a withdraw from NATO—
making an alliance with the conservative People's Party more likely (though still 
unpalatable) in order to retain the support of business owners.21 This coalition did not 
come to pass however, leading to an impasse in the assembly that prevented it from 
passing a budget until well into late 2010. Portugal’s political troubles continued on. 
Sócrates was forced to resign in 2011 following continued poor economic performance 
that made the state the third in the Eurozone to request aid from The European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—
collectively known as the “Troika”.22 
                                               
20 (Erlanger and Minder 2010) 
21 (Socratic method 2009) 
22 (Lewis, Macdonald and Kowsmann 2011) 
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Portugal’s troubles began long before the rest of the other PIIGS states—
reaching as far back as the turn of the millennium and the creation of the Eurozone 
itself. For the past decade, Portugal had been in an economic slump: Its real GDP per 
capita raised less than half the rate of the Euro area average and almost two thirds less 
than their trading partners in the Eurozone from 2000-2007, making it the poorest state 
in the Eurozone.23 Unemployment markers were likewise abysmal, doubling within the 
same time span as there was were marked increases in employment in Spain and 
France.24 During this period Portugal’s economy shifted towards services and other non-
tradable sectors, drastically affecting its current account balance by winnowing out 
Portuguese exports and making them more dependent on imports. Within a single 
decade, Portugal’s foreign-owned debt skyrocketed to € 165 billion—more than its 
entire GDP. When it became clear that Portugal would be unable to service its debt, it 
was forced to seek relief from the IMF and the Troika. 
On April 6th of 2011, caretaker Prime Minister Sócrates officially announced that 
his government would be seeking a bailout of €78 billion in order to help get a handle 
on its current account balance issues, as well as its 9.1% deficit. The deal, which was to 
be executed over the course of three years, would carry an interest rate less than half 
the going market rate for a similar long-term loan. In return, Portugal was tasked with 
reaching certain benchmarks regarding its budget deficit each year: 5.9% of GDP by the 
                                               
23 (Reis 2013) 
24 Ibid. 
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end of 2011, 4.5% by the end of 2012, and 3% by the end of 2013. In addition, Portugal 
was asked to find at least €5.5 billion by selling off government assets and drastically 
cutting government expenditures.25 The government attempted to accomplish this 
through a series of increasingly difficult austerity budgets that have created deep 
political and social unrest within the state. 26 27 28  Following the budget posted in 
October of 2014, thousands of protesters clogged the streets of Lisbon and Porto in 
order to express their frustration with increased austerity measures that further 
reduced wages and social services in the midst of rampant unemployment and 
economic recession.29 
On May 17th 2014, Portugal officially exited its three-year bailout program, 
although its recovery had not been nearly as successful as had been hoped for during 
initial deliberations.30 Sovereign debt remains nearly a third higher than the state’s GDP, 
output has fallen nearly six percent, and unemployment had reached a staggering 
17.6%31—a number that would surely have been higher were it not for the brain drain 
                                               
25 (Kowsmann, Portugal Bailout Plan Detailed 2011) 
26 (Wise, Portugal Announces More Austerity Measures 2011) 
27 (Kowsmann, Portugal Unveils Toughest Austerity Budget Yet 2013) 
28 (Austerity in Portugal 2012) 
29 (Al Jazeera and agencies 2013) 
30 (Wise, Portugal exits bailout without safety net of credit line 2014) 
31 (Portugal’s bail-out: Final Call 2014) 
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caused by the educated youth leaving the state for better prospects abroad.32 Not 
everything was bleak, however: the trade imbalance that was a major source of 
Portugal’s economic slump leading into the financial crisis had turned around into a net 
positive. Although the bailout was not nearly as successful as the Portuguese and the 
rest of the Eurozone had hoped it would be, this is only the first step in the process to 
recovery.  
 
Greece 
When speaking of the Eurozone crisis, it is difficult to overstate the impact that 
Greece’s banking and governmental disingenuity had on not only its own economy, but 
also on those of the other PIIGS states. The public sector was the greatest contributor to 
the crisis by far: in the first half of the 2000s, government wages rose by more than 50% 
while at the same time the government was taking on tremendous debts in order to 
finance the Athens Olympics.33 In addition to this, in October of 2009 it became clear 
that Greece had been intentionally misleading the European community as to the state 
of its current account: its deficit exceeded 13% of GDP—dramatically more than the 3% 
target for Eurozone members—and its sovereign debt topped 115% of the state’s GDP.34  
                                               
32 (Wise, The educated unemployed bid farewell to Portugal and austerity 2013) 
33 (Eurozone crisis explained 2012) 
34 (Europe's sovereign-debt crisis: Acropolis Now 2010) 
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By August of 2011, the S&P had downgraded Greece’s credit rating from A to CC. 
Greece was described by the ratings organization as “Currently vulnerable and 
dependent on favorable business, financial and economic conditions to meet financial 
commitments,”35 indicating a significant probability of default. 
Upon Greece’s first major credit downgrading in 2010, Eurozone members gave 
Greece its first major bailout of €110 billion36 (€80 billion from the Eurozone and €30 
billion from the IMF)37, with the expectation that steep austerity measures would 
follow. By requiring such steep measures, the Troika sent a message to other Eurozone 
members to avoid the failures of Greece, an intent that was directly echoed by the 
German Chancellor:  
Noting that Greece is going to have to make deep and painful cuts to public 
sector pay and benefits while raising taxes sharply, Mrs. Merkel said those harsh 
terms would deter other Eurozone countries from getting into similar pickles. 
Other heavily indebted governments would ‘see that Greece's path, with the 
IMF's strict terms, is not easy, so they will do everything to avoid that for 
themselves,’ Mrs. Merkel said.38 
                                               
35 (Standard and Poor's Rating Service 2015) 
36 (Magnay, et al. 2010) 
37 (Europe agrees a "shock and awe" bail-out for Greece 2010) 
38 Ibid. 
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Over the next several years, Greece passed a series of austerity budgets that 
were met with everything from outrage to riots to suicidal protests.39 40 In 2012, the 
Troika felt that a second “economic adjustment program” was needed in Greece, giving 
the state an additional €130 billion.41 The austerity requirements that came as the price 
for this loan caused some to call the situation experienced by the Greek people a 
“humanitarian crisis” due to the personal sacrifices imposed by the state.42 In early 
2015, the terms of this agreement was revised in order to bring some relief to Greece, 
but recovery is still a long way off.43 Despite this unusual series of bailouts, perhaps the 
most controversial move by the ECB was the 2011 decision to entirely write off half of 
all of Greece’s foreign-owned debt, directly causing the spread of the financial crisis to 
Cyprus—one of the primary holders of Greek debt and our primary subject for the 
remainder of this study.44 
 
The Cypriot Case 
                                               
39 (Weeks and Bensasson 2010) 
40 (Kitsantonis and Donadio, Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After Riots Rage 2012) 
41 (The European Commission 2015) 
42 (Kanter and Kitsantonis 2015) 
43 Ibid. 
44 (Higgins and Alderman, Europeans planted seeds of crisis in Cyprus 2013) 
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As part of its EU accession and adoption of the Euro, Cyprus was forced to meet 
financial convergence criteria that included that rapid liberalization of its fiscal policy 
and financial industries.45 Perhaps due in part to this sudden expansion of the financial 
sector, within three years of adopting the Euro the top Cypriot banks soon found 
themselves in possession of assets over 8 times the GDP of the small island nation.46 
Prior to their accession, Cyprus had maintained a cozy relationship with Russian 
financiers, who made judicious use of the state in Cayman island-like tax evasion and 
money laundering ventures.47 This only increased with further liberalization, making the 
lion’s share of the banks’ assets international depositors. In addition to these factors, 
Cyprus’s historical and economic ties to Greece led them to take on major shares of 
Greek bonds. When the financial crisis tanked Greece’s economy, borrowing costs in 
Cyprus skyrocketed; When Greek foreign debt was partially forgiven, the Cypriot 
economy crumbled.48  
In 2011, the Cypriot national deficit rose to 7.4% GDP, more than twice the 
acceptable amount provided for by the regulations of the European Union.49 As a direct 
result, the ECB imposed sudden capital control and closed the two largest banks of 
Cyprus for two weeks. These actions caused domestic economic output to fall by over 
                                               
45 (Georgiou 2013) 
46 (Milne 2013) 
47 (Eurozone confident on Cyprus bailout 2013) 
48 (Georgiou 2013) 
49 Ibid. 
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5%,50 forcing the Cypriot parliament to approach the ECB for more substantive action 
towards financial stabilization51. On March 25 2013, Cyprus and the ECB agreed upon an 
initial €10 billion bailout package that differed significantly from those received by the 
PIIGS states. The agreement placed the onus of recapitalization on the depositors of the 
Cypriot banks—as opposed to the taxpayers, who would have provided for it through a 
general fund. Though initially categorically rejected by newly-elected Cypriot President 
Anastasiades,52 Cyprus was eventually forced to come to terms with the reality that 
depositors were going to have to take a 10% “haircut” on their accounts over €100,000, 
unprecedented in modern finance.53 Indeed, the deal is better described as a “bail-in” in 
order to reflect the responsibility that is being placed upon individual depositors as 
opposed to the taxpayers at large.  
Why, when under similar financial duress, was Cyprus treated so differently than 
the PIIGS states? This monumental agreement was reached in light of years of fiscal 
mismanagement of the Cypriot banks, both at the private and national levels. When 
financial indicators began to sour in 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA)—the 
regulatory arm of the EU’s financial sector—informed the Cypriot government that their 
national banks should begin to create a “buffer” of around 9% of their tier 1 capital ratio 
                                               
50 (Cyprus one year on: Injured Island 2014) 
51 (Zenios 2014) 
52 (Eurozone confident on Cyprus bailout 2013) 
53 (Barker 2013) 
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(the ratio of a banks’ equity capital and it’s risk-weighted assets54) by July 2012. The 
ECB’s forgiving of Greek foreign-owned debt would make this goal an impossibility: 
none of the previously-successful banks came close to reaching this goal, some missing 
it by nearly one quarter of a billion dollars.55 Had they managed to successfully create 
this buffer, the impact on depositors would have been significantly lessened. 
In addition to their financial mismanagements, the primary Cypriot banks held a 
reputation as dealing in seedier and far more salacious business that may have led to 
their disproportionate punishment by the rest of the European community: they had 
the appearance of having a money-laundering relationship with Russian arms-dealers in 
Syria.56 Even though the illegal nature of their dealing with Russia is questionable,57 
their cozy financial relationship with the country did nothing to help the new member’s 
standing.58 In the end, the most likely reason for the ECB’s punishment of Cyprus is that 
the majority of these financial mishandlings were conducted prior to their induction to 
the Eurozone in 2008 – in effect bringing billions of euros of toxic assets into the 
Eurozone at a critically bad moment. 
                                               
54 (Investopedia 2015) 
55 (Zenios 2014) 
56 (Matthews 2013) 
57 Although, it appears circumstantially damning. Even the business arm of Russia Today is unable 
to deny the strong and questionable financial connection between the two states. See (RT 
Business 2013). 
58 (Higgins, Cyprus Bank's Bailout Hands Ownership to Russian Plutocrats 2013) 
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The Bail-In 
The bail-in is a revolutionary economic tool that I believe will negatively affect 
the future economic stability of the Eurozone states. The bail-in itself consists of two 
primary actions: it divides insured domestic accounts from the affected national banks 
containing under €100,000 into newly-created financial institutions, and it forces the 
remaining accounts with over €100,000 to take a scaling 6.75-9.9% haircut to pay down 
the debt.59 This deal so revolutionized Eurozone economics that the directive 
empowering the ECB to take this action was passed almost exactly a year after talks 
with Cyprus were concluded.60 Prior to the Cypriot case, the Troika did not have the 
power to allocate and divide the assets of financial institutions directly in this manner. 
This has the particularly troublesome effect that certain exclusions and protections 
given to future cases were not applied to the Cypriot crisis (e.g. accrued pension funds 
and other benefits).61 
ECB president Mario Draghi, with the support of Germany and other important 
players in the Eurozone, has lauded the bail-in response as the future model for the EU 
in dealing with financial crises.62 Although the policy will officially go into effect in 2018, 
                                               
59 (Birnbaum and Schneider 2013) 
60 (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2014) 
61 (Zenios 2014) 
62 (Steen 2013) 
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Draghi has been pushing for region-wide adoption as soon as 2015.63 However, this pan-
continental application of bail-in policy is among the most real threats to the stability of 
the Eurozone. As it stands, the European Union is a collective of loosely aligned states 
within a geographic region that share several broad values—democratic representation, 
capitalism, etc.—but differ on many of the nuances. Among the 28 member states of 
the EU, nearly one third elected not to enter the Eurozone—most notably, perhaps, the 
United Kingdom. Since lessened sovereignty in the form of delegated monetary policy 
came part and parcel with the adoption of the Euro, many nations elected not to join.  
Even though the Eurozone ceded control of their monetary policy to the Troika, the 
member nations retain control over their fiscal policy—the separation of which can be 
particularly detrimental to the application of structural debt management solutions.64 If 
you add investor, and even depositor, uncertainty to every fluctuation in the market, 
capital flight and runs on the bank will become crippling and increasingly frequent 
concerns. 
The bail-in has not saved Cyprus. After nearly three years, unemployment 
remains at record highs, domestic income is swiftly eroding, and over half of all loans in 
the country are in a state of default.65 The Eurozone, while recovering, is doing so at an 
                                               
63 Ibid. 
64 (Togo 2007) 
65 (Guzzo 2014) 
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all-too-slow pace. In an Op-ed piece for the New York Times, Paul Krugman looks at the 
relative recoveries of the United States and the Eurozone: 
America has yet to achieve a full recovery from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Still, it seems fair to say that we’ve made up much, though by no means all, of the lost 
ground. But you can’t say the same about the eurozone, where real G.D.P. per capita is 
still lower than it was in 2007, and 10 percent or more below where it was supposed to 
be by now. This is worse than Europe’s track record during the 1930s.66 
It is clear that recovery is taking too long, a problem that the bail-in would not seem to 
remedy if the Cypriot experience is taken as an auger. 
 
Options: Iceland’s Example and the state of the Eurozone 
 Where, then, can we look to find a stronger solution to difficulties such as the 
one experienced in Cyprus? In Iceland, an island that was among the worst and first hit 
by the 2008 financial crisis, under circumstances shockingly similar to those of Cyprus. 
“No other developed country endured a systemic collapse in its banking sector on the 
scale that occurred in Iceland or, indeed, rarely in the history of finance” said 
Sigurjonsson and Mixa in their 2011 report “Learning from the ‘Worst Behaved.’” When 
Iceland’s three main banks, Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing, became insolvent, they 
held assets worth over 10 times the GDP of the small island nation.67 It seems evident 
that Iceland’s insolvency stems from four primary sources: rapid privatization of the 
                                               
66 (Krugman, That Old-Time Economics 2015) 
67 (Milne 2013) 
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state’s financial institutions from 1992-2003 (although general liberalization of foreign 
exchange and fiscal policy began at a much earlier date), inexperience and 
incompetence of banking executives caused by nepotism, financial compensation 
models that encouraged risky investments, and the overleveraging of investments 
abroad in the form of loans, primarily to England and Scotland.68  
Here is where Iceland’s response diverges from Cyprus: to combat the freefall of 
their financial sector, the Icelandic government—in direct opposition to the dominant 
austerity policies of other nations— seized direct control of their banks, separated 
domestic and foreign depositors, and used a $5 billion loan from the IMF and other 
Nordic states to deal with their shortfall and begin direct reinvestment back into the 
market.69 The results have been astounding: 
Few countries blew up more spectacularly than Iceland in the 2008 financial crisis […]. 
Since then, Iceland has turned in a pretty impressive performance. It has repaid 
International Monetary Fund rescue loans ahead of schedule. Growth this year [2012] 
will be about 2.5 percent, better than most developed economies. Unemployment has 
fallen by half. In February, Fitch Ratings restored the country’s investment-grade status, 
approvingly citing its “unorthodox crisis policy response.”70 
The parallels between Iceland and Cyprus here are stunning: two island nations, 
both vying for inclusion in the EU, allowed their primary financial institutions to amass 
                                               
68 (Sigurjonsson and Mixa 2011) 
69 (Hart-Landsberg 2013) 
70 (The Editors of Bloomberg 2012) 
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tremendous amounts of capital—several times in excess of their country’s GDP—in the 
form of questionable foreign investment and debt acquisition, causing their catastrophic 
economic collapses. Even their financial responses were similar: in both cases, the 
depositors of the financial institutions were shuffled around into new banks, leaving one 
set of depositors to bear the brunt of recapitalization. Where Iceland and Cyprus have 
primarily differed comes as a result their relationships with the EU. Whereas Iceland has 
recently halted its once-promising EU accession talks,71 by the start of the financial 
collapse Cyprus had already been accepted as a member of both the EU and Eurozone 
itself.72 Since Cyprus relies on the EU and the European Central Bank (ECB) for monetary 
policy, the country was unable to take the unilateral—and controversial—actions that 
benefited Iceland so well. Where Iceland protected its national depositors by directly 
transferring their assets to new banks—Arion Bank for Kaupthing, Landsbankinn for 
Landsbanki, and Islandsbanki for Glitnir—leaving foreign depositors and creditors to 
take the brunt of their recapitalization efforts,73 Cyprus was forced by the ECB to adopt 
a more radical “bail-in” policy.74  
 Would Iceland’s example work for the Eurozone? Perhaps in some cases, but it 
would not solve the structural deficiencies shown by the ECB’s response to the 
economic crisis. Monetary policy cannot be used as a blunt weapon, ignoring the 
                                               
71 (The Associated Press 2013) 
72 (Georgiou 2013) 
73 (Milne 2013) 
74 (Jenkins, Jr. 2013) 
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specific qualities of each state’s circumstance in its implementation, nor can it be fully 
divested from fiscal policy. In light of this, there are two potential paths that the 
Eurozone can pursue in the future: the current path, where nations are bound by the 
ECB’s monetary policy; or, the path of political union. Neither option is perfect. The 
current path allows for the maintenance of the status quo, where the Eurozone member 
states can claim to their people to remain sovereign entities—while in fact being 
hamstrung in their ability to react fully to financial mishaps through the coordination of 
all available political tools. The path of political union is by far the more radical, due to 
its total subsuming of national sovereignty to the EU, but may be the most lasting 
option for the success of the Euro that can be offered. By unifying fiscal and monetary 
policy, thereby tearing down the last of the borders that separate the states of the 
Eurozone, it can be possible to make targeted changes to the financial landscape to 
provide for the best possible outcomes.  
 The Eurozone is unlikely to collapse anytime soon—the costs, both political and 
economic, associated with such a move are impossible to fully calculate—but that does 
not mean that the system is living up to its true potential. Cyprus is merely a symptom 
of greater unease within the union. Unless these various nations, divided by millennia of 
cultural differences and united only by shared geographic and economic goals, are able 
to come together and work as one body—with each nation being treated fairly and as 
equal partners—then the monetary union they have created will fail, even as it limps 
through the coming years. 
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